Flota fantomă a Rusiei din Marea Baltică: cum poate fi oprită și ce efecte ar avea asupra Kremlinului

Russia’s shadow fleet continues to transport oil and petroleum products, even in the face of Western sanctions, generating billions of euros for the Kremlin. Editor Marco Seeliger of the Neue Zürcher Zeitung warns that the Moscow regime is financing its aggression against Ukraine and military rearmament through these exports. Five measures could at least partially slow down the activity of this fleet. 

The example of an oil tanker in the Baltic Sea, part of the ghost fleet

In August, the oil tanker Bosca was sailing between the German island of Fehmarn and the Danish island of Lolland, carrying Russian oil from the port of Primorsk. The nearly 250-meter-long ship has changed flags five times over the years and now flies the flag of Malawi. The Bosca is part of the so-called ghost fleet – the gray area of ​​global maritime trade – that funds the Kremlin’s military budget. On average, three such ships cross the Baltic Sea every day, carrying oil from the ports of Ust-Luga and Primorsk.

The importance of stopping Russia’s ghost fleet for the West

According to the German Federal Center for Political Education, about 200 loaded oil tankers leave Russian ports illegally every month. 75% of Russian oil shipments come from the Baltic and Black Seas, bringing the Kremlin 15 billion euros annually. The ghost fleet and its operations undermine Western sanctions, increasing the need to complicate the work of ships by increasing risks and costs.

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Measure 1: Pressure on buyers and blacklists

The most effective measure is not applied at sea, but on land, on oil buyers and logistics services. Russia exports massively to India and China, where cheap oil is also profitable for the Kremlin. The West could condition access to weapons, technology and markets on a ban on the import of oil from sanctioned ships, which would directly affect the ghost fleet. States such as France and Germany can use this context to achieve military cooperation with India, providing strategic leverage, writes the Moscow Times .

US sanctions are the most effective. A tanker blacklisted by the US Treasury becomes a pariah. The banks, buyers and ports that service it risk secondary sanctions. Currently, more than 200 ships are sanctioned by the US, 150 by the EU and a similar number by the UK. This pressure has forced Russia to offer substantial price reductions to compensate for the risks and costs of transportation.

Measure 2: Detention of unsuitable vessels

Navigation restrictions on the ghost fleet can only be applied in exceptional cases, such as the risk of an ecological disaster. The Baltic countries have been checking the insurance of oil tankers since the end of 2024, and Finland and Estonia have detained ships such as the Eagle S and Kiwala. Requesting valid insurance, covering accidents, could become mandatory when entering the Baltic Sea, causing difficulties for the ghost fleets.

Measure 3: Unified civil-military surveillance system

Currently, the Baltic Sea is monitored militarily under German command, but civilian coordination is lacking. Germany has several agencies responsible: customs, the federal police, the maritime administration and the Ministry of Agriculture. The proposal is to create a regional coordination center with the participation of military structures. The system would integrate satellite data, drones, radar, underwater reconnaissance and financial data to track the movements of ships in the ghost fleet and detect the deactivation of identification systems, thus affecting the ghost fleets.

Measure 4: NATO containment and patrols

NATO ships have been patrolling the Baltic Sea to protect undersea cables and pipelines since January 2025. The mission could be expanded to monitor oil shipments, following the example of Operation Aspides in the Red Sea. The problem: Russia may interpret the expanded military presence as an escalation.

Measure 5: Naval blockade against the ghost fleet

A blockade between Denmark and Sweden is only possible after an official declaration of a state of defense. International law guarantees freedom of navigation in peacetime. Politician Roderich Kiesewetter considers the Baltic a real front against the Russian flotilla, and defensive operations are permissible. However, without extensive international support, a real blockade remains impractical.